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TRANSFORMING HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION FROM AN EXPEDIENT 
ACCIDENT TO A CATEGORICAL 
IMPERATIVE 
Mirko Bagaric* and John R. Morss** 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
istory, even if one focuses on the past fifty years, is re-
plete with almost countless instances of preventable 
mass killings of people at the hands of their own government.1  
In nearly all cases, the rest of the world has stood idly by, some-
times apparently frozen into inaction.  Wealthy nations have 
remained deliberately ignorant of events, their citizens glued to 
MTV or the next major sporting event.  Despite their power, 
these nations consistently fail to intervene militarily in order to 
bring a quick end to government-sponsored mass killings.2 
This is not to deny that there has been considerable discus-
sion regarding the merits of humanitarian military interven-
  
 * Professor and Head of School, Deakin University Law School, Geelong, 
Victoria, Australia.   
 ** Associate Head of School, Deakin University Law School, Burwood, 
Victoria, Australia.   
 1. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (assessing the 
complaints of Croat and Muslim citizens of the internationally-recognized 
nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, formerly a republic of Yugoslavia, who claimed 
that they were victims of various atrocities, including brutal acts of rape, 
forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture and summary execution, 
carried out by Bosnian-Serb military forces as part of a genocidal campaign 
during the Bosnian civil war); J. L. Holzgrefe, The Humanitarian Intervention 
Debate, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:  ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL 
DILEMMAS 15–17 (J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane eds., 2003) [hereinafter 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION] (describing the atrocities in Rwanda beginning 
in 1994). 
 2. Examples include the mass killing of citizens in Cambodia, Sudan, 
Rwanda, among many others.  See, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the 
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light of the Atrocities in Kampu-
chea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT’L L. 547, 550 (1987) (discussing killing of 
Cambodians by the Khmer Rouge); Romeo Dallaire, Looking at Darfur, Seeing 
Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at A25. 
H 
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tion.3  As observed by James Upcher in his analysis of interna-
tional law and humanitarian intervention: “[w]hether seen as 
right, responsibility or missionary enterprise, the merits of in-
tervention are commonly framed within a wider debate about 
the putative conflict between human rights and state sover-
eignty.”4 
Formally, the main obstacle to humanitarian intervention is 
the notion of state sovereignty.5  In reality, however, the main 
disinclination to stop preventable mass killings of strangers in 
other parts of the world is simply that they are strangers and 
are in other parts of the world.6  On rare occasions, the world (or 
parts of it) has “stepped up” and drawn a line in the sand—a 
line inscribed on a moral or political plane, as contrasted with 
the geographical line marking a state's boundary—and said 
“no” to despots to stop them from more mass killings of their 
citizens.7  While this has been rare, the success of these inter-
ventions, combined with an absence of criticism following such 
  
 3. See, e.g., BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL 
INTERVENTION (Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno eds., 1995) [hereinafter 
BEYOND WESPHALIA] (collecting essays from presentations on international 
intervention and theoretical issues about the nature of state sovereignty and 
the evolution of international society); ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
83–85 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2003) (stating that those who favor hu-
manitarian intervention see intervention as a necessity which restores human 
rights and democracy; argues that principles of sovereignty and non-
intervention should be abandoned); Holzgrefe, supra note 1, at 17 (discussing 
the legal and ethical issues implicated by the international community’s lack 
of intervention into the Rwandan crisis and those which might have arisen if 
it had intervened). 
 4. James Upcher, ‘Savage Wars of Peace’? International Law and the Di-
lemma of Humanitarian Intervention, 9 DEAKIN L. REV. 261, 263 (2004). 
 5. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 
111 (June 27) (state sovereignty is closely linked with the principles of the 
prohibition of the use of force and of non-intervention codified in, inter alia, 
Article 2.1 and 2.4 of the United Nations Charter); U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 
paras. 1, 4. 
 6. As is discussed infra, state sovereignty is, at least at the pragmatic 
level, not a barrier to humanitarian intervention.  There are numerous exam-
ples of successful armed military humanitarian intervention which have been 
declared as being contrary to international law. 
 7. The best example perhaps being Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda in 
1978, in order to overthrow Idi Amin.  Thomas M. Franck, Interpretation and 
Change in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 219.  
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actions, demonstrates that state sovereignty is no barrier to 
humanitarian interventions.8  Indeed, this suggests that respect 
for state sovereignty is an excuse, rather than a reason, for the 
inaction of the world community. 
At present, humanitarian intervention is subject to the vaga-
ries of geo-political forces beyond the comprehension of even the 
most ardent student of or commentator on international affairs.9  
The only clear trend seems to be that proximity to Western 
Europe enhances the chances that intervention will occur.10  
Overall, intervention is adventitious, almost accidental, or even 
opportunistic in nature.11  In this Article, we suggest a process 
whereby humanitarian intervention can be systematized and, 
moreover, transformed into a duty upon nations.  Human life, 
especially when there are thousands at stake, is too important 
to leave to chance.  
We need some kind of “bureaucratizing [of] the Good Samari-
tan.”12  That is to say, altruism needs to be established in an 
administrative manner, rather than left to voluntaristic hap-
penstance. The principles that properly govern humanitarian 
intervention must be international ones, neutral as to the spe-
  
 8. Id. at 220. 
 9. John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 793 (2004). 
 10. Compare Kosovo (intervention) with Somalia and Rwanda (no inter-
vention).  Id. 
 11. There is a long history of opportunistic interventions justified on sup-
posed human rights grounds (such as protecting minorities), including:  Ja-
pan’s 1931 invasion of Manchuria, Hitler’s 1938 invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
and India’s 1987 military intervention in Sri Lanka.  Thomas G. Weiss & Ja-
rat Chopra, Sovereignty under Siege: From Intervention to Humanitarian 
Space, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA, supra note 3, at 93.  Ad hoc intervention is 
typified by, for example, the military intervention carried out after the first 
Iraq war, to protect the Kurds of Northern Iraq, without the consent of the 
government of Iraq.  Robert H. Jackson, International Community Beyond the 
Cold War, in BEYOND WESTPHALIA, supra note 3, at 79.  Negative conse-
quences of the ad hoc approach are discussed by ORFORD, supra note 3, at 13. 
 12. TONY WATERS, BUREAUCRATIZING THE GOOD SAMARITAN: THE 
LIMITATIONS TO HUMANITARIAN OPERATION 3 (2001).  Today, the task of engag-
ing in and completing humanitarian operations is more efficient for the victim 
and the donor than in the past because organizations providing relief have 
become more bureaucratized.  Id.  Bureaucracy allows the inherent functions 
of the organization to be broken down into tasks done by specialists hired and 
trained to do each action efficiently and effectively.  Id.  In this way, today’s 
Good Samaritan agencies are not unlike the large bureaucracies of modern 
business and government.  Id.   
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cific States involved in any particular case.13  For this reason, 
the imperative for intervention, when it exists, will be a cate-
gorical imperative in a (at least quasi-) Kantian sense: the rule 
must be such that in willing it, we must will it as universal.14  
Further, its imperative nature will be of the essence: when the 
necessary conditions are fulfilled, corresponding action must be 
taken; failing to take action results in extending culpability to 
bystanders. 
It is undeniable that the world's population, as a whole, con-
tinues to suffer in large numbers.  Poverty is a major cause: 
“about 2.8 billion people still live on less than $2 a day and the 
richest one percent of the world’s people receives as much in-
come each year as fifty-seven percent of the poorest.”15  More-
over, armed conflict and internal strife have continued un-
abated.   A perfect example of this is the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda that “left some 800,000 ... murdered in 100 days,” while 
France “armed and diplomatically defended the genocidal gov-
ernment.”16  During the twentieth century alone, it is estimated 
  
 13. The neutrality that is sought may be something of an ideal, given the 
problematic nature of neutrality in the context of humanitarian intervention.  
Amy Bartholomew, Human Rights and Post-Imperialism: Arguing for a Delib-
erative Legitimation of Human Rights, 9 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 25, 35 
(2003). 
 14. Immanuel Kant argued that true moral imperatives are “categorical”; 
that is, they are demands upon individuals and entities that would be ac-
cepted by all as universally applicable, irrespective of preferences, conven-
ience or cost-benefit analyses on any particular occasion.  See H. J. PATON, THE 
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: A STUDY IN KANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 127–32 
(1948).  
 15. Ivan Simonovic, Relative Sovereignty of the Twenty First Century, 25 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 371, 380 (2002).  
 16. Samantha Power, Raising the Cost of Genocide, in THE NEW KILLING 
FIELDS: MASSACRE AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION 250 (Nicolaus Mills & 
Kira Brunner eds., 2002).  The Rwandan genocidal campaign began when a 
plane carrying Rwanda’s Hutu President, Juvenal Habyarimana, was de-
stroyed by a surface-to-air missile.  Rwanda Marks Genocide Anniversary, 
BBC NEWS, June 6, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa 
/3602859.stm.  “The crash served as a signal to Hutu extremists, supporters of 
the government, to start the systematic liquidation of minority ethnic Tutsis 
and any Hutu opponents of the regime.”  Id.  Despite France’s denial of in-
volvement in the mass killings, Rwandan President Paul Kagame has as-
serted that France trained the Rwandan “militia to kill, knowing they in-
tended to kill.”  Id.  According to the BBC, France was the closest ally of the 
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that governments killed 170 million of their own citizens.17  This 
is greater than the total number of people killed in wars be-
tween States, including both World Wars.18   
In essence, the gap between rich and poor nations is not di-
minishing.19  As a result, many of the world's citizens do not en-
joy the most basic of amenities required for subsistence, let 
alone the opportunity to flourish.20  Today, despite the popular-
ity of human rights as a discussion topic,21 the fight for gender 
  
Hutu regime in 1994 and it was known that French military advisers worked 
with the Hutu government army right up to the beginning of the genocide.  Id. 
 17. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT 2002: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD 2, 6 (2002). 
 18. Simonovic, supra note 15, at 376.  During the First World War, ap-
proximately 8.5 million military combatants died, compared to approximately 
13 million civilian casualties.  See, e.g., ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, OUT OF 
CONTROL: GLOBAL TURMOIL ON THE EVE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1993).  
The death toll for the Second World War is estimated at 71 million, which 
includes military deaths, civilian deaths as a direct result of hostilities, civil-
ians killed during the Sino-Japanese War, and as a result of Hitler’s murders. 
Id. at 9.  However, different sources estimate different counts; the median 
death toll approximated by these sources is 50 million.  See Matthew White, 
Twentieth Century Atlas: Worldwide Statistics of Casualties, Massacres, Dis-
asters and Atrocities, Matthew White’s Homepage, at http://users.erols. 
com/mwhite28/20centry.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2005).  White estimates that 
during the twentieth century, approximately 188 million people have died as a 
result of genocide and tyranny, military conflicts including both combatant 
and civilian deaths, and man-made famine.  Id.   
 19. BOARD ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
OUR COMMON JOURNEY: A TRANSITION TOWARD SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 71 
(1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309067839/html/ (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2005) (“Recent increases in wealth could be seen as leading to a world 
characterized both by the popular economics maxim—a rising tide raises all 
boats big and small—and by the increasing division between rich and poor in 
absolute as well as relative terms.”). 
 20. Roughly 2.8 billion people live on less than $2 a day and the wealthiest 
one percent of the world’s population receives as much income annually as 
fifty-seven percent of the world’s poorest.  Simonovic, supra note 15, at 380. 
 21. See, e.g., Upcher, supra note 4, at 263 (discussing debate over the con-
flict between human rights and state sovereignty in the context of humanitar-
ian intervention); THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION 
AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS (2002) (discussing the use of force in 
cases of egregious violation of human rights and humanitarian law); Kathe-
rine M. Culliton, Finding a Mechanism to Enforce Women’s Right to State 
Protection From Domestic Violence in the Americas, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 507 
(1993) (discussing the enforceability, under international human rights law, of 
American women’s fundamental right to state protection from domestic vio-
lence). 
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equality continues,22 unemployment and poverty are increas-
ing,23 people are dying of hunger and illness every day24 and the 
right to asylum is being questioned.25  
In this Article, we do not attempt to propose a solution to the 
general problems afflicting the world’s citizens not fortunate 
enough to be born in a First World nation.  The analysis within 
this Article is confined to one particular problem faced by mil-
lions of non-First World citizens: how to reduce the chance that 
they will be summarily killed by their own government.  If this 
problem is not expressly addressed now, legal and social com-
mentators will be forced to address the same issue into the 
twenty-second century.  We should not wait until then.  It is 
only reasonable to believe that waiting will result in future gen-
erations seeking solutions while lamenting the killing of an-
other 170 million or more people by their own government.  One 
century with 170 million preventable deaths is sufficient reason 
to seriously consider fundamental reform of the global approach 
to government-sponsored killings of their own people.  
It is important to note from the outset that the prospect of 
developing a workable principle for humanitarian intervention 
is realistic only if carried out in full awareness of the difficulties 
  
 22. See Culliton, supra note 21, at 507.  See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190 (1976) (striking down an Oklahoma statute for reasons of gender-based 
discrimination); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding that 
classifications based upon sex are inherently suspect and must be subjected to 
strict judicial scrutiny). 
 23. See, e.g., Carina J. Miller, Protecting the Argentine Jewish Community 
and Jewish Identity in Times of Crisis: Local Efforts, Global Community, and 
Foreign Support, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 677, 680 (2004) (“The process of economic 
liberalization and restructuring undertaken in the mid-1990s increased the 
concentration of income in the wealthiest sectors of society, generated increas-
ing rates of unemployment and poverty, and left millions of Argentines with 
precarious jobs or with multiple poorly paid jobs.”); Paul Lewis, World Bank 
Says Poverty is Increasing, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1999, at C7 (the number of 
people living on less than $1 per day rose from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion from 
1987 to 1999). 
 24. See Lewis, supra note 23. 
 25. See Mirko Bagaric & Penny Dimopoulos, Refugee Law—Time for a 
Fundamental Re-Think:  Need as the Criterion for Assistance, 9 CANTERBURY 
L. REV. 268, 270–92 (2003).  See also Andrew Clapham, Remarks, 35 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 517, 520 (2004) (“The question of terrorism is sometimes 
now portrayed as human rights granting people too many rights to asylum, 
too many rights to lawyers while under interrogation, too many rights from 
physic pressure during interrogation.”). 
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involved.  First, the circumstances under which humanitarian 
intervention will be permitted must be clearly designated.  This 
requires specific articulation of the rights to be protected.  Sec-
ond, a proportionality requirement must be included to ensure 
that the cure is not worse than the illness.  Finally, rules of rea-
sonableness must be implemented to prevent occupying forces 
from exploiting the other State. 
The following section of this Article provides a brief overview 
of the law on humanitarian intervention.  Part III discusses the 
moral dimension of altruistic conduct in relation to interven-
tion.  The final substantive section of this article, Part IV, dis-
cusses development of a workable principle for humanitarian 
intervention and the circumstances in which States should be 
compelled to use force to save strangers in distant places.   
II.  LAW OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE SLOW 
DEMISE OF SOVEREIGNTY  
A.  Problems Associated with Humanitarian Intervention  
Since the second half of the twentieth century, wars for terri-
tory (i.e., interstate wars) have largely been replaced by strug-
gles for power within States.26  This trend both reflects, and con-
tributes to, the decline in significance of state sovereignty in the 
twenty-first century.27  In relation, human rights abuses, often 
associated with internal State conflicts, present stark chal-
lenges to traditional State-based international law.28  With in-
trastate conflicts it becomes necessary to ask whether, and/or 
under what circumstances, a State may declare that an emer-
gency situation legitimises the abrogation of its human rights 
  
 26. Susan Strange, World Order, Non-State Actors, and the Global Casino: 
The Retreat of The State?, in POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL 
ORDER 82, 84 (Richard Stubbs & Geoffrey Underhill eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
 27. Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno, Introduction: International 
Intervention, State Sovereignty, and the Future of International Society, in  
BEYOND WESTPHALIA, supra note 3, at 3. 
 28. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, Political Authority After Intervention: 
Gradations in Sovereignty, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 
273. 
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obligations.29  Humanitarian law30 has adapted and expanded in 
recognition of the changing nature of conflicts around the world, 
but it has not yet satisfactorily answered the question: “[h]ow 
can military intervention ever be humanitarian?”31  As state 
sovereignty weakens and intervention becomes increasingly 
likely, the urgency in finding an answer to this question in-
creases.  
Humanitarian intervention always takes place in a political, 
as well as a legal and moral environment.32  As observed by 
James Upcher, “[p]roponents of intervention have a double 
task: both justifying the legality of a doctrine of intervention, 
and exposing the antiphonal pronouncements of governments 
pursuing illicit and venal motives behind humanitarian rheto-
ric.”33  Some international commentators have identified an 
emergence of intervention in the human rights law that has 
developed since the inauguration of the UN Charter.34  These 
commentators discern a recalibration of sovereignty in favour of 
ethical concerns.35  Citing Michael Ignatieff, Upcher notes that, 
for such commentators, “to defend the principle of non-
intervention, contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter, is to de-
  
 29. See generally JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992) (examining the international standards governing 
protection of human rights in situations of public emergency). 
 30. Humanitarian law is generally defined as the law relating to armed 
conflict.  See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON 
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 
AUGUST 1949, at 654 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno 
Zimmermann eds., 1987) (stating that the expression of international hu-
manitarian law applicable in armed conflict means international rules, estab-
lished by treaties or custom, which are specifically intended to solve humani-
tarian problems directly arising from international or non-international 
armed conflicts and which, for humanitarian reasons, limit the right of Par-
ties to a conflict to use the methods and means of warfare of their choice or 
protect persons and property that are, or may be, affected by conflict). 
 31. Robert O. Keohane, Introduction, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, 
supra note 1, at 1. 
 32. Michael Ignatieff, State Failure and Nation–Building, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 299. 
 33. Upcher, supra note 4, at 263. 
 34. Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for 
Incremental Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 245. 
 35. Id.  
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fend, in many cases, the perpetration of tyranny and terror.”36  
Consistent with the views of such pro-interventionist commen-
tators, it has been argued that “the drafting history of the UN 
Charter displays an awareness that, despite the prohibition on 
intervention in Article 2(4), force can be a permissible response 
to humanitarian catastrophe.”37   
B.  Humanitarian Intervention as Condoned Anomaly in Inter-
national Law  
Specific examples of (putative) humanitarian intervention il-
lustrate various general features of the process.  Commonly 
cited examples of broadly successful intervention include:  In-
dia’s intervention in the war between Pakistan and East Paki-
stan (Bangladesh) in 1971;38 Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 
1978 and 1979;39 and Tanzania’s intervention to remove Idi 
Amin from Uganda in 1979.40  On the basis of these examples, it 
has been claimed that “state practice…demonstrate[s] that 
states believe the right of unilateral humanitarian intervention 
is available to them as an option grounded in either the Charter 
or customary international law.”41  However, neither India, 
Vietnam or Tanzania sought legitimacy for their actions by ref-
erence to a norm of humanitarian intervention.  Indeed, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations called upon India to 
withdraw its troops from East Pakistan,42 despite India’s claim 
  
 36. Upcher, supra note 4 (citing Michael Ignatieff, Why are We in Iraq? 
(And Liberia? And Afghanistan?), N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 7, 2003, at 38); see 
also Ignatieff, supra note 32, at 299.  U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 (“All Mem-
bers shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
 37. Upcher, supra note 4, at 269; see also Franck, supra note 7, at 204.  
 38. Franck, supra note 7, at 216 (“[I]n 1971, India invaded East Pakistan 
after military repression against separatists in that province had escalated to 
the point where a million persons had died and 8 million had fled to India.”). 
 39. Id. at 217 (“Vietnam invaded Cambodia, in 1978, to rid it of a Khmer 
Rouge regime responsible for the deaths of at least 1 million people.”). 
 40. Id. at 219 (“[I]n 1978 … Tanzania invaded Uganda to topple the mur-
derous regime of Field Marshal Idi Amin.  Some 300,000 deaths had been 
attributed to [Amin’s] rule.”).  
 41. FRANCIS KOFI ABIEW, THE EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 133 (1999).  
 42. The territory formerly known as East Pakistan is now the nation of 
Bangladesh.  Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 
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of self-defence and its comments on human rights-based neces-
sity.43  Vietnam and Tanzania both (if implausibly) claimed self-
defence.44  
In 1979, France’s contribution to the overthrow of Bokassa in 
the Central African Empire, a clear breach of Article 2(4),45 was 
not justified by France on humanitarian grounds.46  The only 
modern-era assertion of a unilateral humanitarian justification 
for military intervention was by one of the three intervening 
States in the 1991 Iraq no-fly zone situation, constituting “a 
single partial exception in a half-century of non-intervention on 
humanitarian grounds.”47  Thus, even a “successful” interven-
tion struggles to find legitimacy in terms of humanitarian fac-
tors.  Additionally, the United Nations has been implicated in 
several “horrendous failures” based upon its unwillingness or 
inability to intervene in intrastate conflicts (e.g., Bosnia,48 An-
  
MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1629 (1984).  G.A. Res. 2793, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess.,  
Supp. No. 29, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/L.647/Rev.1 (1971). 
 43. India’s self-defense claim was based upon the large influx of refugees 
from East Pakistan.  Franck, supra note 7, at 216–17.   
 44. Id. at 217, 219.  
 45. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states: “All Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 
para. 4. 
 46. Franck, supra note 7, at 220. 
 47. Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules About Rules?  
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 184. 
 48. In the 1990s, the former nation of Yugoslavia dissolved and erupted 
into religious and ethnic genocide among Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and ethnic 
Albanians.  In July 1995, thousands of Muslims were killed by Bosnian Serb 
forces in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica in a campaign of “ethnic cleansing.”  
From March to June of 1999, Serbian forces intensified attacks on Kosovo and 
forcibly expelled more than 850,000 ethnic Albanians.  Rape and sexual vio-
lence were major components of the Bosnian Serb’s ethnic cleansing.  U.N. 
peacekeeping efforts were inadequate throughout.  Finally, NATO responded 
with a bombing campaign on Serb forces around Kosovo.  For further informa-
tion, see Human Rights Watch, Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Fall of Sre-
brenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping, 7 HUM. RTS. WATCH REP., no. 13, 
at Summary (1995), available at http://www.hrw.org/summaries/s.bosnia 
9510.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).  See also Human Rights Watch, A Vil-
lage Destroyed: War Crimes in Kosovo, 11 HUM. RTS. WATCH REP., no. 13(D), at 
Summary (1999), available at http://hrw.org/reports/1999/kosovo3/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 28, 2005).   
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gola,49 Somalia50 and Rwanda51).52  Clearly, something needs to be 
done. 
III.  THE NORMATIVE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSION: 
(UNSOUND) REASONS FOR RESISTING HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
It is necessary to look closely at the moral dimension of hu-
manitarian intervention and to examine what has been called 
the “breadth” or “weight” of the moral concern.53  There are two 
  
 49. In April 2002, the signing of a cease-fire agreement brought to an end 
nearly three decades of civil war in Angola.  During the war, hundreds of 
thousands died and millions were displaced.  Between 1991 and 1992, an es-
timated 1.3 to 2 million Angolans fled their homes.  Between 1998 and 2002, 
an additional 3.1 million people fled their homes.  The international commu-
nity was slow to respond with adequate funds and logistics, even failing to 
respond in some situations.  For more information, see Human Rights Watch, 
Struggling Through Peace, Return and Resettlement in Angola,  15 HUM. RTS. 
WATCH REP. No. 1, 5–8 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 
2003/angola0803/angola0803.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).   
 50. In 1991, Somalia’s longtime dictator fled the country and Somalia 
erupted into anarchy and famine as clans of armed militias fought for power.  
During 1991 and 1992, an estimated 500,000 Somalis died before the world 
community took serious action.  In December of 1992, the United Nations 
Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) finally began to support aid deliveries, 
backed by 24,000 U.S. troops and 13,000 others (they departed in 1995).  For 
more information, see Human Rights Watch, Somalia Faces the Future, Hu-
man Rights in a Fragmented Society, 7 HUM. RTS. WATCH REP., no. 2, at Sum-
mary (1995), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/somalia/ (last vis-
ited Feb. 28, 2005).   
 51. Between April and July of 1995 alone, an estimated 800,000 Rwan-
dans, mostly Tutsi, were killed in the genocide by Rwandan Hutus, a loss 
representing an estimated 75% of the Tutsi population.  Although the U.N. 
had peacekeeping troops on the ground, it did not order them to try to stop the 
violence.  The Belgian troops in the U.N. peacekeeping forces even withdrew 
from the country.  The United States took essentially no action.  For more 
information, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: 
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/ 
rwanda/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).   
 52. See Elizabeth Consens, Conflict Prevention, in THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 101, 103 (David Malone 
ed., 2004). 
 53. Holzgrefe, supra note 1, at 51.  Holzgrefe states: 
What should the breadth and weight of one’s moral concern be?  
Should it extend beyond one’s family, friends and fellow citizens?  
Should it extend to those nameless strangers in distant lands facing 
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main grounds, apart from the sovereignty consideration, that 
enable powerful States to deny moral culpability for refusing to 
prevent mass killings. They are the “Acts and Omissions Doc-
trine” and the “Doorstep Principle.”  The following two sections 
explore each these grounds and explain why they need to be 
abandoned. 
A.  Acts and Omissions Doctrine  
1.  Overview of the Doctrine 
The Acts and Omissions Doctrine is relied upon by First 
World nations as a basis for deflecting liability for mass killings 
in other parts of the world.  The Doctrine provides that people 
are only responsible for their positive acts, as opposed to events 
that they fail to prevent (omissions).54  This Doctrine demar-
cates the circumstances in which individuals must help others 
in order to prevent life itself from becoming intolerably bur-
dened.  The Acts and Omissions Doctrine describes (and possi-
bly explains) the fact that people tend not to feel obliged to de-
vote substantive resources to assisting people who are worse off 
than themselves.  The Doctrine acknowledges that individuals 
feel less responsible for the deaths and tragedies they fail to 
prevent than those they directly cause.55  Thus, the Doctrine is 
  
genocide, massacre, or enslavement?  Should the needs of these 
strangers weigh as much as the needs of family, friends, and fellow 
citizens? 
Id.  
 54. See, e.g., Kelly Green, Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthana-
sia: Safeguarding Against the “Slippery Slope”—The Netherlands versus the 
United States, 13 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 639, 645 (2003) (discussing the 
impact of the Doctrine in the debate over morality and legality of physician-
assisted suicide and euthanasia). 
 55. The Acts and Omissions Doctrine states that, morally, it is less egre-
gious to omit doing an act which leads to a foreseeable negative result than it 
is to actually commit an act which leads to the same negative result.  For ex-
ample, under the Doctrine it is a lesser evil to fail to throw a life preserver to 
a person who is drowning than it is to push someone one knows cannot swim 
into the water to drown him or her.  This moral distinction generally rests 
upon the notion that an omission is equivalent to not intervening in events 
which have already unfolded, i.e., the person was already drowning, versus an 
act which actually sets events into motion, i.e., pushing someone into the wa-
ter to drown them.  Thus, passive inaction, or omission, is less morally irrep-
rehensible than action, because the person is not the source of causation.  See 
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one justification for why failure to provide food to starving peo-
ple in other nations is generally not equated with the reprehen-
sibleness of shooting one’s neighbour.56  Nonetheless, this Doc-
trine is unsound.  
Morality seems to make very few positive demands of indi-
viduals.57  Generally, morality is delineated into a set of nega-
tively-framed rules proscribing certain behaviours.58  However, 
it is premature to conclude that we have discharged our moral 
obligations simply because we have not violated these negative 
rules. There are occasions when acting morally requires us to do 
more than merely refrain from certain behaviour, occasions 
when we must actually do something.59  Defining morality ex-
haustively as a set of negative proscriptions fails to explain why 
refusal to act in various situations would be considered morally 
repugnant.60  
  
KUMAR AMARASEKARA & MIRKO BAGARIC, EUTHANASIA, MORALITY AND THE LAW 
115–19 (2002).  See also Helga Kuhse, Euthanasia, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 
294, 297 (Peter Singer ed., 1991). 
 56. Kuhse, supra note 55, at 297.  Kuhse states: 
Is the distinction between killing and letting die … morally signifi-
cant? ....If killing and letting die were morally on a par, so the argu-
ment goes, then we would be just as responsible for the deaths of 
those whom we fail to save as we are for the deaths of those whom we 
kill—and failing to aid starving Africans would be the moral equiva-
lent of sending them poisoned food … but even if a morally relevant 
distinction can sometimes be drawn between killing and letting die, 
this does not, of course, mean that such a distinction always prevails. 
Id.  
 57. See Mirko Bagaric, A Utilitarian Argument: Laying the Foundation for 
a Coherent System of Law, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 163, 174 (2002) [hereinafter Ba-
garic, A Utilitarian Argument]. 
 58. See id. at 163–80.  
 59. See, e.g., Kuhse, supra note 55, at 298; PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL 
ETHICS 206–08 (2d ed. 1993).  
 60. Examples of inaction being deemed morally repugnant include such 
scenarios as:  Bill Gates refusing to give his loose change to a starving peas-
ant, or declining to save a child drowning in a puddle in order to avoid getting 
one’s shoes wet, or refusing to throw a life-ring to a person drowning beside a 
pier.  John Gardner has discussed the implications of a “self-effacingly ex-
treme care” for others as a hypothetical model for tort.  John Gardner, Obliga-
tions and Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY: 
ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORÉ ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 111, 112 (Peter Cane & 
John Gardner eds., 2001). 
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2.  The Maxim of Positive Duty 
Morality demands performance of a positive action infre-
quently.61  When such situations do arise, however, the obliga-
tions can be so clear, pronounced and unwavering that it would 
be implausible to postulate an account of morality which is not 
consistent with and explicable of such a requirement.62  In addi-
tion to the negative postulates of morality is one very important 
positive one:  we must assist others in serious trouble when as-
sistance would immensely help them at little or no inconvenience 
to ourselves.63  This is the Maxim of Positive Duty.64 
The Acts and Omissions Doctrine is incapable of explaining 
why individuals are appalled when they learn of clear breaches 
of this maxim.  The public loathing directed at the passive wit-
nesses of the 1964 murder of Kitty Genovese in Queens, New 
York is a practical illustration of the operation of the maxim 
(although as always, hindsight does wonders for moral judge-
ment).65  Whether harm ensues as a result of an act or omission 
  
 61. See Kuhse, supra note 55, at 297–98. 
 62. Bagaric, A Utilitarian Argument, supra note 57, at 174.  
 63. See SINGER, supra note 59, at 230–31.  There are some who would deny 
that any such duty exists.  See, e.g., E. Mack, Bad Samaritans and the Causa-
tion of Harm, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 230 (1980) (arguing against the implemen-
tation of Bad Samaritan Laws as a cure for the harm caused by inaction).  
However, we agree with John Harris, who labels the denial of such a duty as 
“very odd,” at least in an intuitive sense.  JOHN HARRIS, THE VALUE OF LIFE 31 
(1985). 
 64. See generally Bagaric, A Utilitarian Argument, supra note 57 (includes 
the Maxim of Positive Duty in a list of universal moral principles).  See, e.g., 
AMARASEKARA & BAGARIC, supra note 55 (concluding that legalization of 
euthanasia is misguided because the right to die for a few is outweighed by 
the right to live by the many; states that the “high demands of morality” at 
times requires the few to suffer in order to promote the common good); Craig 
Scott & Patrick Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guar-
antees? Social Rights in a New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 55 (1992) (providing examples from international human rights law sug-
gesting that there is a principle of positive duty regarding prevention and 
protection of human rights).  
 65. Kitty Genovese was beaten and stabbed by her assailant over a 35 
minute period in Queens, New York.  The assault took place within the view 
of 38 “normal,” law-abiding citizens who did nothing to assist her.  Witnesses 
failed to call the police or even yell at the offender. When a 70-year-old woman 
finally called the police, it took them only two minutes to arrive.  Yet, by this 
time, Genovese was already dead.  See, e.g., LOUIS P. POJMAN, ETHICS: 
DISCOVERING RIGHT AND WRONG 1 (1990). 
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is not central to the moral appraisal of an action.  The critical 
issue is whether one is responsible for the harm, where respon-
sibility is assessed from the perspective of all of the norms and 
rules of morality, including the Maxim of Positive Duty. 
Arguably, the Maxim of Positive Duty, as compared with the 
Acts and Omissions Doctrine, provides a far more accurate and 
coherent basis for rejecting intolerable demands on one’s time 
and resources.  Morality is essentially a set of negative con-
straints plus the Maxim of Positive Duty.66  The proviso to the 
Maxim, “when there is little or no inconvenience to oneself,” 
readily explains why our duty to assist others is extremely lim-
ited.67  As one commentator on humanitarian intervention ob-
served, “rescuing others will always be onerous.”68  As this 
statement makes clear, the definition of “little or no inconven-
ience” is crucial in determining what level of altruistic perform-
ance will be required by the Maxim. 
This Maxim of Positive Duty ties in neatly with humanitarian 
intervention.  As a maxim guiding behaviour, it explains why 
we are required to make some sacrifices for other people, even 
in distant parts of the world.  Within the Maxim’s proviso is the 
necessary limitation that we need not be “slaves” to the needs of 
others, running to every skirmish in any part of the world.  Ad-
ditionally, as will be discussed in the following section, it is im-
portant to note that our more distant fellow populations (our 
“non-neighbours,” so to say) are included in this Maxim by vir-
tue of the fact that there is no logical or normative basis for 
ranking the interests of one person higher than another.69  The 
Maxim of Positive Duty always involves the need to weigh the 
  
 66. Bagaric, A Utilitarian Argument, supra note 57, at 174 (rejecting a 
subjectivist and cultural relativist approach to morality, the author lists four 
universal moral principles: (1) do not kill; (2) do not steal; (3) do not lie, and; 
(4) assist others when it will result in little or no inconvenience to oneself). 
 67. Of course, an ethical position based on the needs of others (such as that 
articulated by Emmanuel Levinas) would not recognise the self-centred (if 
pragmatically unexceptionable) limitation of reasonable personal cost.  See 
John Morss, Saving Human Rights from its Friends: A Critique of the Imagi-
nary Justice of Costas Douzinas, 27 MELB. U. L. REV. 889, 894–98 (2003). 
 68. Fernando Tesón, The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 129.   
 69. Bagaric, A Utilitarian Argument, supra note 57, at 177 (arguing that 
utilitarian morality is premised on widespread community support based on a 
reciprocal pursuit of happiness). 
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number of lives at stake against the resources that will be re-
quired to save those same lives.70  Where the persons in need 
are “overseas,” the resources that will be required are of an in-
ternational nature.  
B.  The Doorstep Principle 
In order for the Maxim of Positive Duty to have a practical ef-
fect it is necessary to address the Doorstep Principle.  The 
Doorstep Principle describes the empirical fact that proximate 
suffering matters more to individuals than anonymous, distant 
suffering.71  The fact that individuals are reluctant to advance 
the interests of their non-neighbours has no normative founda-
tion.72  The Doorstep Principle may be simply a general aspect of 
human nature, i.e., people have an increased psychological re-
sponse to immediate perceptual events rather than remote 
ones.73  Of course, it should also be acknowledged that socio-
political forces and media influences have created a cultural 
milieu that prioritizes certain people (especially family) as de-
serving a significantly higher level of care than other people.74 
For whatever reason, it appears that humans are driven to 
far greater lengths to assist those whose suffering they are 
forced to directly confront than those whom they can ignore.75  
  
 70. This necessarily follows from the criteria used in the formula when 
applied to the context of humanitarian intervention.  
 71. See SINGER, supra note 59, at 224 (suggesting that when the people 
harmed are not identifiable individuals, it is difficult for people to comprehend 
a duty to attempt to save them). 
 72. The extent of another's suffering is not measured by our capacity to 
directly sense it, neither is the scope of our moral duties.  SINGER, supra note 
59, at 229–31 (arguing that the duty to save a child from drowning is no less 
compelling than assisting those living in absolute poverty). 
 73. Just as babies respond much more strongly to a “looming” object (i.e. an 
object approaching them on a “hit course” and thus perceptually expanding in 
a rapid and symmetrical manner) than to an approaching object that will 
safely bypass them.  T.G.R. BOWER, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 55 (1979). 
 74. The “global catastrophe” genre in literature and films tends to reinforce 
the special status of close kinship.  The movie The Day After Tomorrow repre-
sents this tradition in its portrayal of a father’s commitment to fulfill a prom-
ise made to his son, that promise acquiring the status of an oath.  THE DAY 
AFTER TOMORROW (20th Century Fox Film Corp. 2004). 
 75. Robert Jackson, International Community Beyond the Cold War, in 
BEYOND WESTPHALIA, supra note 3, at 79 (noting that several highly-
publicized attempts at mass immigration into First World nations resulted in 
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Of course, humans have a staggering capacity to ignore even 
very proximate suffering.  A good example of individual willing-
ness to ignore suffering is the notorious obedience experiments 
of Stanley Milgram.76  Milgram’s research subjects believed 
themselves to be taking part in an experiment on learning 
(which, in a sense, they were).77  In the course of the experi-
ment, subjects were directed to “punish” a stranger for his mis-
takes by using electric shocks.78  The degree of pain the subjects 
believed they were inflicting upon the stranger was remarkable, 
even when the research subjects themselves were directly con-
trolling the delivery of (supposed) electric shocks.79  Additionally, 
when research subjects instructed a third person to administer 
the shocks, the voltage level used on the stranger increased dra-
matically.80  Even when “victim” and subject were sitting next to 
each other, and delivery of the shock required that the subject 
physically place the victim’s hand on a metal plate, many sub-
jects still complied—turning their bodies away from the victim 
at the same time.81  
Milgram’s experiments show that humans are able to dis-
tance themselves from the suffering of others, even suffering 
they are directly inflicting.  At another level, the infliction of 
pain on another person may be cognitively re-configured by the 
perpetrator as being unavoidable, beneficial, or the fault or de-
sire of the other person.  It is a small wonder that a majority of 
the citizens of the Third Reich were able to ignore the suffering 
of those persecuted by the government and placed in concentra-
  
those nations taking action, in the form of economic aid, to support the immi-
grants’ countries).  As Robert Jackson has commented, “we may be our 
brother’s keeper, but brotherhood for most purposes is limited to common 
nationality.”  Id. 
 76. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974).  The 
“victim” was an actor, and no shocks were actually delivered to him, but there 
is every reason to think the situation subjectively realistic.  Id. at 3.  Certainly 
the experimental subjects’ reflections on their actions, following debriefing, 
are striking and convincing.  Id. at 24. 
 77. Id. at 3. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 5 (a substantial proportion of participants were willing to shock 
the “victim” at the highest level on the generator, 450 volts). 
 80. Id. at 119, 122.  
 81. Id. at 33–36.  
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tion camps.82  Thus, immediate lives weigh far more heavily on 
the sympathy scale than distant ones—at least when perceived 
immediacy is accepted as having more than a merely physical 
dimension.83   
1.  Ignoring the Interests of Our Non-Neighbours 
is Unjustified  
Most adults in the First World are aware that every minute 
of the day people are dying in distant parts of the world due to 
readily preventable causes.  The fleeting glimpse of starving 
children on the evening news appears to evoke some sense of 
sympathy, guilt or responsibility in most people.  Unfortu-
nately, humans are too good at escaping these feelings.  Rather, 
we need to be educated that the limits of personal and State 
responsibility are not exhausted by our capacity to successfully 
block out “distant” human suffering and recognize that 
“[n]othing justifies valuing one life ahead of another.”84  There is 
simply no logical or normative principle which can be univer-
sally applied for ranking one person’s happiness above the next 
person.85  
The Doorstep Principle sums up why nations have been slow 
to stop the mass killing of other countries’ citizens by their own 
governments.  Additionally, it explains why First World coun-
tries have been, despite an overt commitment to human rights 
and equality, spectacularly successful in ignoring the plight of 
  
 82. See generally DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING 
EXECUTIONERS (1996) (describing the role of ordinary German citizens in the 
Holocaust).     
 83. This seems to be one explanation for the fact that in 1995, the Austra-
lian Government spent $5.8 million rescuing French sailor Isabelle Autissier, 
who was stranded while on a solo voyage around the world, when the same 
money could have saved thousands from starvation.  Gender, Sexualities and 
Sport, THE SPORTS FACTOR, June 27, 1997, at http://www.ausport.gov.au/full 
text/1997/sportsf/sf970627.htm. 
 84. Peter Singer, Nothing Justifies Valuing One Life Ahead of Another, 
THE AGE (Austl.), Apr. 1, 2003, available at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/ 
2003/03/31/1048962698034.html. 
 85. Self-interest or self-preservation may explain an agent ranking his or 
her interests over those of another person, but these considerations cannot 
ground a general principle justifying such conduct.  From the perspective of 
the other person, the same considerations support a preference in his or her 
favor. 
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those in Third World countries.86  In order for humanitarian in-
tervention to become an established norm, it is necessary to de-
bunk the Doorstep Principle and to adopt the Maxim of Positive 
Duty.  It is only after such a change that genuine, effective 
moral pressure can be placed on States.  Eliminating the Door-
step Principle from our collective psyche is, admittedly, not 
likely to be an easy matter.  However, as with any reform, the 
first step to progress is identification of a problem.  
IV.  CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
IS JUSTIFIED:  TOWARDS “RULES OF ENGAGEMENT”  
A.  Overview of Problems   
In setting the boundaries for legitimate humanitarian inter-
vention, it is important to be cognisant of the difficulties of such 
measures.  The first difficulty of humanitarian intervention 
stems from the inherent contradiction in using force in order to 
protect rights.87  Force invariably results in the killing of people, 
and hence violates what might be thought of as the most fun-
damental right of all—the right to life itself.88  The “rules of en-
gagement” for humanitarian intervention must surely take ac-
count of this proportionality issue.  Issues concerning the pro-
portionality of force arise both with respect to the initiation of 
military conflict (jus ad bellum) and the conduct of military 
forces in conflict situations (jus in bello).  Generally, it is diffi-
cult to determine the exact interests that the international 
community should defend via force.89  Questions as to whether 
other nations should forcibly defend only the basic right to life, 
or whether they should also be concerned with lesser rights, 
such as the right to own property, to vote, to privacy, to freedom 
  
 86. Simonovic, supra note 15, at 380. 
 87. See generally CHRISTOPHER G. WEERAMANTRY, ARMAGEDDON OR BRAVE 
NEW WORLD: REFLECTIONS ON THE HOSTILITIES IN IRAQ (2003) (discussing the 
possible effects the U.S./U.K. invasion of Iraq will have on international law; 
advocating for the international community to embrace the United Nations 
and its fundamental policy against the use of force).   
 88. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 72 (1948) (“Everyone has the right 
to life, liberty and security of person.”). 
 89. Yoo, supra note 9, at 794. 
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of association, and so on, must be addressed.90  The broader the 
scope of protected rights, the greater likelihood for interpreta-
tive arguments, and hence abuse.91 
A second difficulty is that any principle prescribing humani-
tarian intervention is likely to be imprecise—leaving ample 
scope for self-serving interpretation.92 As one well-known com-
mentator observed, 
[T]he pages of history abound with instances of governments 
waging war to edify citizens marooned on unenlightened 
shores, the loftiness of ethical ambition matched only by impe-
rial appetite. Cicero’s theory of jus gentium sanctioned the ex-
pansion of the Roman Empire and the slaughter of the bar-
barians at the gates; Alberico Gentili infamously justified the 
Spanish conquest of the new world by the need to correct the 
behaviour of savages ignorant of natural law; and Hugo 
Grotius’ stout legitimation of the ‘right to punish’ comple-
mented perfectly the ascent of Dutch colonial ambition.93 
More recently, it was observed that:  “[s]tates strong enough 
to intervene and sufficiently interested in doing so tend to have 
political motives. They have a strong temptation to impose a 
political solution in their own national interest.”94  Thus safe-
guards, in the form of a reasonableness requirement, must be 
developed to prevent states from manipulating the principle 
authorising humanitarian intervention to serve their narrow 
  
 90. See, e.g., James Gathii, Foreign and Other Economic Rights upon Con-
quest and Under Occupation: Iraq in Comparative and Historical Context, 25 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 491 (2004) (discussing private property rights after 
the 2003 occupation in Iraq and elsewhere). 
 91. Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, The War in Iraq:  The Illusion of 
International Law?  Where to Now?, 8 DEAKIN U.  L. REV. 147, 171 (2003).  This 
propensity for interpretive arguments and abuse is evident in the self-defense 
argument used by the United States in the most recent war against Iraq.  Id. 
at 157. 
 92. As in “the ideology of the redeemer nation,” described by Deborah 
Weissman, where the intervening state entertains a perception of itself as the 
savior of the populous of the occupied state.  Deborah Weissman, The Human 
Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the Humanitarian Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 259, 266 (2004).  See also Gathii, supra note 90, at 555 (describing how 
there is typically an encounter based on a “self-righteous Western cultural 
project” contrasted with a non-Western civilization that is perceived as “back-
ward, barbaric, poor, smelly, and lazy.”). 
 93. Upcher, supra note 4, at 265. 
 94. Schachter, supra note 42, at 1629. 
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political interests.  Development of the principle may well stand 
or fall on the effectiveness of such safeguards of reasonable-
ness.95  Therefore, such safeguards should be built into any 
“rules of engagement.”  
B.  Setting Out the Criteria  
To begin, it is important to tentatively identify grounds for 
military intervention into another nation based upon humani-
tarian concerns.  The issue of necessity is clearly central to hu-
manitarian intervention.96  As James Upcher comments: 
In many respects, necessity serves as a repository of assorted 
doctrines that can wheel international law into a place at the 
table. It is a pliable friend, serving both moral and strategic 
masters ... necessity is sufficiently amorphous to respond to 
the asymmetric threats posed by terrorism, unshackling states 
from the self-defence mechanisms of the UN Charter, and 
massaging pre-emption into a legitimate legal category.97 
Thus, necessity as a legitimation of intervention must be 
scrutinised in the broad context of the international use of force.  
This Article is not intended to support the employment of the 
necessity argument by military aggressors.  Therefore, (hu-
manitarian) necessity needs to be defined to exclude military 
adventure and opportunism.  In so doing, the present status of 
necessity as a general category for international action should 
not be affected.98  Certainly, once humanitarian necessity is bet-
ter defined, other putative forms of necessity will require corre-
sponding clarification.  It may well be that outside of (properly 
  
 95. See e.g., Keohane, supra note 28, at 275. 
 96. At the International Court of Justice in 1999, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia claimed that the NATO bombing of Kosovo was against interna-
tional law.  Belgium responded that NATO action was justifiable under the 
principle “of necessity … which justifies the violation of a binding rule in order 
to safeguard, in the face of grave and imminent peril, values which are higher 
than those protected by the rule which has been breached.”  Upcher, supra 
note 4, at 275 (citing Oral Pleadings of Belgium, Legality of the Use of Force 
(Yugo. v. Belg.), CR/99/15 (May 10, 1999) (uncorrected translation available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iybe/iybeframe.htm)). 
 97. Upcher, supra note 4, at 274. 
 98. Though, potentially, necessity justifications may be constrained.  Ken-
neth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in 
Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 9–10 (2004). 
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delimited) self-defence and humanitarian necessity, necessity is 
a vanishingly small category of defence for a state’s activities,99 
as it has proved to be within individual criminal justice. 
An innovative extension of necessity, in the context of hu-
manitarian intervention, has been urged by Antonio Cassese.100  
Traditionally, in order to substantiate use of customary inter-
national law, state conduct needed to be accompanied by a more 
subjective sense of legal obligation—the opinio juris sive neces-
sitatis.101  Cassese explored the idea that the subjective element 
of opinio juris is not required, as such, if a state believes that it 
is acting out of political, economic or moral necessity.102  Cassese 
calls this concept the opinio necessitatis.103  In the case of Kos-
ovo, for example, Cassese proposes that the evidence of such 
opinio necessitatis was “strong and widespread.”104  
Cassese’s theoretical claim is speculative and perhaps prema-
ture, but his related list of preconditions for humanitarian 
countermeasures is illuminating.  Political, social and moral 
necessity are not boundless concepts.  Rather, Cassese provides 
  
 99. Presumably, a natural disaster like a tidal wave or earthquake, or even 
perhaps a man-made localised catastrophe, might justify mass incursion of 
one state’s population into another state to escape the danger. 
 100. Antonio Cassese, Ex Inuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards Inter-
national Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the 
World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 23 (1999) [hereinafter Cassese, Ex 
Inuria Ius Oritur]; Antonio Cassese, A Follow-Up: Forcible Humanitarian 
Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 791, 791 (1999) 
[hereinafter Cassese, A Follow-Up].   
 101. Cassesse, A Follow-Up, supra note 100, at 797.  See also Allen Bu-
chanan, Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 1, at 134–36 (discussing use of cus-
tomary international law in the context of humanitarian intervention and the 
role of opinio juris). 
 102. Cassesse, A Follow-Up, supra note 100, at 797.  See also Jörg Kam-
merhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary 
International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 534–35 
(2004) (discussing the subjective obligatory component of opinio juris).   
 103. Cassese, A Follow-Up, supra note 100, at 797.  An unfortunate term in 
view of the complete phrase, opinio juris sive necessitatis. Cassese’s concept 
was that the act was considered necessary, rather than compliance with an 
international customary law being necessary or obligatory (as with the ortho-
dox requirement of opinio juris).  Id. 
 104. Id. at 798.  Cassese argued that those (NATO) states that intervened in 
Kosovo did so on the genuine basis that genocidal aggression would continue 
until such action was taken.  Id. at 797. 
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six conditions for armed intervention in the absence of Security 
Council authorisation: (i) gross breaches of human rights by a 
government or with its connivance or resulting from its col-
lapse; (ii) inability or unwillingness by the government to pre-
vent the breaches, or to allow outside help; (iii) inability or un-
willingness of the Security Council to take action; (iv) exhaus-
tion of practicable peaceful options; (v) involvement of a group 
of states in the intervention and with some measure of General 
Assembly approval; (vi) rapid termination of military action 
once abuses have been terminated.105    
While the sentiments expressed by the cumulative operation 
of these conditions are laudable, ultimately the conditions may 
well be too expansive. The fourth condition, requiring the ex-
haustion of practicable peaceful options, may in particular in-
troduce unnecessary obstacles to (or at least delays to) interven-
tion.  Humanitarian intervention is appropriate when large-
scale killings are government sanctioned and/or conducted by 
elements within a State which cannot be stopped by the gov-
ernment.  This is the only condition that needs be satisfied in 
order to justify armed humanitarian intervention.  It is impor-
tant to emphasise that the only currency we are concerned with 
is the death of innocent people.  Other human rights abuses, no 
matter how likely and how egregious, are unlikely to warrant 
intervention—given the inevitable loss of life caused by military 
intervention and the requirement of proportionality.  
1.  Proportionality 
Necessity, properly defined, may thus fulfil the requirements 
of “ad bellum”—the decision to initiate intervention—but can-
not fully determine the “in bello”—the conduct during the inter-
vention.  To ensure that intervention is not self-defeating, a 
principle must be adopted that acknowledges that the number 
of lives that are likely to be lost as a result of the intervention 
cannot exceed the number that are likely to be lost if no action 
is taken.106  This condition has its root in the Principle of Propor-
tionality.  As Richard Fox notes, the notion that any response 
must be commensurate to the harm caused, or sought to be pre-
  
 105. Cassese, Ex Inuria Ius Oritur, supra note 100, at 27.  
 106. This requirement is also suggested by Cassese’s sixth condition for 
military intervention without Security Council approval.  Id.  
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vented, strikes a strong intuitive chord.107  The concept of pro-
portionality underpins many domestic and international legal 
maxims.108  In its most simplistic (and most persuasive) mani-
festation, proportionality provides that “the punishment should 
fit the crime.”109  It is also part of the reasoning behind civil law 
damages, which aim to compensate for the actual loss suffered, 
and equitable remedies, which are proportional to the detriment 
sought to be avoided.110  
Proportionality also underpins the notion of self-defence at 
the individual level.  Self-defence, as a defence to an individual 
crime, would be unavailable to a person whose response to be-
ing pushed in a crowd was the use of lethal force.111  Such a vio-
lent response would not be considered self-defence because it is 
entirely out of proportion with the initial action.  Lethal force is 
generally considered self-defence only when an individual’s life 
is threatened.112  Additionally, the notion of self-defence may 
extend to the defence of another.  In certain circumstances, an 
individual may use lethal force to protect the life of a third per-
son.113  Such parallels between humanitarian intervention and 
  
 107. Richard Fox, The Meaning of Proportionality in Sentencing, 19 MELB. 
U. L. REV. 489, 491 (1994).   
 108. See, e.g., id.; Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in Interna-
tional Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 391, 391 (1993). 
 109. The phrase is derivative from W. S. Gilbert’s The Mikado, but may be 
said to characterise a sentiment going back at least to the “an eye for an eye” 
of the Old Testament.  W. S. Gilbert, A More Human Mikado, in THE MIKADO 
OR THE TOWN OF TITIPU (Opera: First perfomed on Mar. 14, 1885).  
 110. Fox, supra note 107, at 491. 
 111. Other potential examples include: a homeowner shooting a person be-
fore he entered the homeowner’s property or a homeowner who captures the 
burglar and keeps him chained up as his slave. 
 112. See Model Penal Code § 3.04, reprinted in JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT 
WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 1175 (3d 
ed. 1996).  Lethal force may be used in self-defense only if it is necessary to 
prevent the individual’s death, but may not be used if:  the individual pro-
voked the use of force, the individual is able to retreat from the situation, or 
otherwise surrender possession of an item or comply with a demand.  MPC § 
3.04(2)(b).  Id. at 1176. 
 113. See Model Penal Code § 3.05, reprinted in KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 
112, at 1176.  The right to use force to protect a third person is justifiable 
under MPC §3.05 when:  (1) the actor would be justified in using force to pro-
tect himself if he were in the situation of the third person, and (2) under the 
circumstances as he believes them to be, the third person would be justified in 
using force, and (3) the actor believes the intervention is necessary.  Id.   
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self-defence are important.  In effect, the principle of humani-
tarian intervention advanced in this Article seeks to establish a 
norm of defence of another, similar to that provided by criminal 
law, as a maxim of international law.  
The proportionality requirement will necessarily be crude 
when it comes to comparing the likely loss of lives that will 
stem from military intervention as opposed to inaction.  How-
ever, with increasingly sophisticated weaponry and intelligence 
equipment now being used in modern day combat (as was dem-
onstrated in Iraq in 2003)114 and the supreme military advan-
tage enjoyed by the United States and other Western powers 
over those States who are likely objects of humanitarian inter-
vention,115 we argue that a meaningful estimate of the number 
of lives to be lost as a result of intervention is possible.  This 
estimate must include the likely loss of personnel defending a 
State from what they perceive or are instructed to perceive as 
an invasion.  As noted above, there is no moral bookkeeping 
mechanism that justifies prioritising the loss of one life over 
another.  While the conditions in which humanitarian interven-
tion is justifiable can be clearly stated to avoid misuse of this 
power, there are several constraints that must be developed.  
2.  Reasonableness 
In devising an effective principle of humanitarian interven-
tion, an important objective is to prevent (as much as possible) 
  
 114. See, e.g., Alessandra Stanley, A Nation at War: The TV Watch, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, at A1 (describing the televising of the initial invasion 
and the “riveting display of American power”). 
 115. Such disparity in military and political might can have substantial 
impact on the global outcry over abuses, and States’ willingness to initiate 
intervention.  It may be observed that human rights abuses by China (e.g., in 
Tibet or in Tianenmen Square), Russia (e.g., Chechnya), or, arguably, the 
United States (in Guantanamo), have not called forth military intervention by 
Third World states.  See, e.g., Jane Perlez, U.S. Report Harshly Criticizes 
China for Deterioration of Human Rights; Russia Also Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2000, at A8; Asia Hesitant to Ease Curbs Despite Rapid Growth: Hu-
man Rights Watch, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 14, 2005; Peter Small, Ti-
anenman Survivors Remember Candlelight Vigil Tonight in Toronto, THE 
TORONTO STAR, June 4, 1994, at A21; Michael Wine, Rights Group Cites 
Abuses by Moscow and Chechen Guerillas, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at A3; 
Joel Brinkley, Report Says U.S. Human Rights Abuses Have Eroded Support 
for Efforts Against Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2003, at A9. 
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occupying forces profiting or otherwise benefiting from their 
intervention.  Once stationed in another state, it is not difficult 
for an occupying force to argue for ongoing occupation on the 
basis of the ongoing need to preserve law and order, even if the 
occupation has contributed to the problem.116  As a result, an 
occupation that was initially lawful may later become unlaw-
ful.117  This problem raises issues that go beyond straightfor-
ward proportionality. 
This danger can be minimised by ensuring that a minimum 
number of nations with seemingly disparate interests must 
form part of any “intervening team.”118  This should be but-
tressed with the principle that the occupying force must exit 
immediately upon a new government being installed, which 
must be done within a defined period after the removal of the 
(presumably totalitarian) regime.119  This period should be no 
more than twelve months.  To ensure timely exit of occupying 
forces, a reciprocal citizenship principle should be established, 
giving citizens of the “liberated” state automatic citizenship 
rights in the state of the occupier(s) if the occupation extends 
beyond the twelve month period.120  
A cautious analogy may be drawn with respect to the condi-
tions under which human rights protection may be abrogated 
  
 116. This is patently the case in present-day Iraq.  More generally, democ-
ratic accountability mechanisms are inadequate in relation to troops dis-
patched overseas.  Michael Glennon, The United States: Democracy, Hegem-
ony, and Accountability, in DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE USE OF 
FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (Charlotte Ku & Harold Jacobson eds., 
2002). 
 117. Schachter, supra note 42, at 1630–31.  Generally, this is an issue of 
necessity.  Id.  If the intervention is prolonged beyond the need that initially 
gave rise to the intervention, or if the interveners abuse their power through 
subsequent interference with the state, the intervention loses its legal quality.  
Id. 
 118. Again, this is in line with Cassese’s proposals.  Cassese, Ex Inuria Ius 
Oritur, supra note 100, at 27. 
 119. For a discussion of the present humanitarian obligations of an occupy-
ing force, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
ISSUES IN A POTENTIAL WAR IN IRAQ, sec. IX, at http://www.hrw.org/backgroun 
der/arms/iraq0202003.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2004); WEERAMANTRY, supra 
note 87, at 67–73.  
 120. See Bagaric & McConvill, supra note 91, at 174.  The twelve month 
period for humanitarian intervention settling and reconstruction is the only 
exception that should be permitted to the reciprocal citizenship principle.  Id. 
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by states of “emergency.”  It is usually held that under certain 
narrow and short-term conditions, some human rights protec-
tions may be suspended by a state.121  The state of emergency in 
such a case may be analogized to the emergency arising from 
human rights violations that instigate outside intervention. 
While seemingly representing the very opposite of the situation 
addressed by this Article—in one case a government-declared 
emergency giving rise to human rights concerns; in the other, 
human rights concerns giving rise to external intervention—the 
question addressed in both is the conflict of obligations and how 
this conflict may be resolved in a principled manner.122  Indeed, 
for one state or group of states to invade another in the name of 
a humanitarian crisis is precisely to declare a state of emer-
gency that legitimates the displacing of usual conventions.123  
Accordingly, for a state of emergency to legitimate the deroga-
tion of certain rights,124 several specific conditions must be met.  
These include exceptionality, proportionality, non-
discrimination, last resort, and a “principle of temporariness.”125  
These conditions clearly parallel the prerequisite conditions 
necessary for legitimate military intervention. 
3.  Rules of Engagement 
The suggested rules of engagement, namely necessity, pro-
portionality, and reasonableness, all correspond to the accepted 
limits on self-defence in both individual criminal and in inter-
  
 121. See ANNA-LENA SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATES OF EXCEPTION 567 (1998).  
 122. See generally ORAA, supra note 29.  Also note, for a state to proclaim an 
emergency (putatively, to legitimate derogation of rights) is itself not an ex-
clusively internal affair according to the UN Commission on Human Rights.  
Id. at 247.  Parallel to this is the international status or salience of a serious 
humanitarian crisis within the boundary of a state.  Id.  In both circum-
stances, “normal” state sovereignty is called into question.  Id. 
 123. Id. at 34.  
 124. There are four rights commonly asserted in three major instruments 
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 171; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123) to be non-
derogatable: life, freedom from torture, freedom from slavery, and non-
retroactivity of penal laws.  ORAA, supra note 29, at 96, 264. 
 125. Id. at 225, 260. 
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national contexts.  This is no accident.  In both humanitarian 
intervention and self-defence, force is being sanctioned; how-
ever, that sanction is highly conditioned.  As noted above, hu-
manitarian intervention and self-defence are highly analo-
gous.126  Yet, there is also one important difference:  self-defence 
(despite the implicit factor of necessity) cannot represent an 
imperative, as we are advocating should be the situation with 
humanitarian intervention.  
4.  The Move from Grace and Favour to Expectation  
Humanitarian intervention may rarely be justified, but when 
cases arise it surely must be considered an imperative.  While it 
may generally be thought philosophically dubious to move from 
“is” to “ought,” the move seems legitimate in such situations.  
Facts should drive actions.  The difficulty, perhaps, lies in the 
fact that States (or other organisations, such as NGOs), rather 
than individuals, would be subject to the “ought.”  Yet, a paral-
lel could be drawn with Article 39 of the United Nations Char-
ter, under which the Security Council is directed to “determine 
the existence of any threat to peace…” and to make appropriate 
recommendations or take action in response to such a threat.127  
Moreover, there are international obligations under the 1982 
Law of the Sea Convention for States to “cooperate to the fullest 
possible extent in repression of piracy,”128 an obligation that de-
rives from long-standing custom.  Heinous acts, such as geno-
cide, give rise to not only universal jurisdiction,129 but also (at 
least arguably) to some obligation to take appropriate action.  
The organ that should be charged with this duty is the Security 
  
 126. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 127. U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the exis-
tence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and 
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in ac-
cordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.”). 
 128. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 
100, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1288 (“All states shall cooperate to the fullest possible 
extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place out-
side the jurisdiction of any State.”). 
 129. ROBERT MCCORQUODALE & MARTIN DIXON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 288 (4th ed. 2003).  
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Council, given that it is the U.N. entity authorised to approve 
military action.130  
Presently, there are two situations in which the Security 
Council can authorise the use of force.  These relate to:  
1. The right of individual or collective self-defence in re-
sponse to an armed attack provided under Article 51 of 
the Charter.131 
2. Specific authorisation of the use of force by the Security 
Council as a last resort to maintain international peace 
and security under Chapter VII of the Charter.132  
Military action aimed at preventing the killing of people by 
their own government does not fit neatly into any of these cate-
gories unless it has the potential to escalate into a wider con-
flict.  However, as noted in Part II, although humanitarian in-
tervention is rarely (clearly) permitted under existing interna-
tional law, it is seldom the subject of wide-ranging or intense 
criticism.133  In part, this is no doubt a result of the malleable 
and seemingly directory, as opposed to compulsory, nature of 
international law. In order to clearly accommodate humanitar-
  
 130. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.  See also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 213–15 (2003). 
 131. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.  Article 51 states: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of in-
dividual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.  
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Se-
curity Council under the present Charter to take at any time such ac-
tion as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. 
Id. 
 132. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.  In addition to this, it has been argued that a 
customary international law right of pre-emptive self-defense may exist.  See 
generally Christopher Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards a Doctrine of 
Anticipatory Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation Intervention, 15 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 151 (2002) (discussing preemptive self-defense); see also Robert J. 
Beck & Anthony C. Arend, International Law and Forcible State Response to 
Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT’L L.J. 153, 213 (1994) (discussing various scholars 
opinions on the topic, but ultimately concluding that there is no general con-
sensus). 
 133. See infra Part II.B. 
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ian intervention, it is desirable to amend the Charter to ex-
pressly provide for a norm of intervention in the circumstances 
outlined in this Article.  
The most effective means to achieve the goal underpinning 
humanitarian intervention is to make military intervention 
mandatory in cases of actual or impending human catastrophe.  
History shows us that (even if one ignores self-interest) left 
solely as a discretionary aspiration goal, States have too much 
armoury at their disposal—in the form of the Acts and Omis-
sions Doctrine and the Doorstep Principle—to expect more than 
token or patchy adherence to saving the lives of innocent people 
in distant parts of the world.  We are not suggesting that the 
members of the Security Council should alone assume the mili-
tary responsibility for providing troops and weapons to neutral-
ise tyrannical regimes.  This would be best achieved by giving 
the Security Council the authority to muster “Coalitions of the 
Willing,”134 perhaps selected by ballot, to supply the necessary 
resources.  
Unfortunately, the notion of compulsion in international law 
is not well-defined.135  It is even less well-policed and enforced.  
This is especially the case where the (potential) violators are 
powerful States, such as those forming the Security Council.  
Clearly, threats of military action or economic sanctions will not 
be countenanced against such States if they breach their duty of 
humanitarian intervention.  Certainly, these States would not 
agree to a resolution proposing the possibility of tangible sanc-
tions against themselves.136  Therefore, a more modest, yet 
equally effective, mechanism is required.  
A way forward is to expand the provisions of the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951137 to accord a right of 
asylum in Security Council nations to people who manage to 
  
 134. See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States 
Relating to International Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 348, 351 (2000) (describing 
Sen. Helms suggestion that “coalitions of the willing” would help sovereign 
nations coordinate collective action). 
 135. Universality, where it exists, is thus a matter of jurisdiction which 
empowers rather than compels States to undertake certain extraordinary 
actions.  MCCORQUODALE & DIXON, supra note 129, at 288. 
 136. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 137. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150. 
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escape a humanitarian disaster when the Security Council, for 
whatever reason, has been remiss in discharging its obligations.  
Of course, this provision would require a body which could serve 
as arbiter to determine if the Security Council has breached its 
duty.  It would be reasonable to have the arbiter role filled by 
providing extraordinary jurisdiction to the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ), coupled with a stipulation that ICJ jurisdiction 
could be invoked by an individual who claims standing as a 
refugee from a nation torn by military conflict.  If expanding 
this provision is thought to be too ambitious (or for any other 
reason unachievable), there is still considerable utility in man-
dating a requirement of humanitarian intervention.  Even ab-
sent a tangible sanction against those putatively responsible for 
launching the intervention, the detriment to a State’s reputa-
tion is a powerful tool against their inaction. The moral con-
demnation that stems from breaching a duty, while not an irre-
sistible lever, is infinitely preferable to the total impotence that 
stems from the mere “adoption” of aspirational ideals. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
The lessons of history show that there is little, if any, appetite 
to provide humanitarian assistance to other States.  Thus, any 
force sanctioned on this basis will often be for an ulterior, self-
interested motive.  This is not necessarily a problem.  As long as 
the humanitarian crisis is resolved, the motive that under-
pinned the intervention may be of secondary importance.  How-
ever, impure motives can lead to continuing problems—
“protectors” can readily become “exploiters.”  Once a State has a 
foothold in another State, the potential for self-interest to 
dominate is immense.  The tendency toward self-interest pro-
vides a window into the international community’s hesitance to 
mandate military intervention for humanitarian purposes.  It 
has been said that “[t]he human rights project must be fixed to 
prevent it from becoming a system that facilitates the self-
serving desires of a dominant nation.”138  
However, an absolute rule preventing the use of force in such 
circumstances might lead to unthinkable tragedies in the fu-
ture.  The horror of such situations urges strongly in favour of 
  
 138. Weissman, supra note 92, at 336. 
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humanitarian intervention in extreme circumstances.  Such 
intervention should be constrained to situations of impending 
large scale tragedy.  The executions by Idi Amin’s Ugandan gov-
ernment of approximately 300,000 people in the 1970s would 
surely satisfy this requirement,139 as would the killing of over 
two million people between 1975 and 1979 in Cambodia by the 
Pol Pot-led Khmer Rouge.140  Situations akin to the selective 
food distribution in Ethiopia in 1987, which led to millions of 
people starving, would also justify humanitarian intervention.141  
Indeed, with starvation continuing to be a massive problem in 
Ethiopia,142 it is arguable that humanitarian intervention would 
be justified in Ethiopia at the present time.  At the time of writ-
ing this Article,143 the Sudanese government was in the process 
of slaughtering and driving out thousands of members of the 
Zaghawa, Masalit and Fur tribes in the Dafur region of Sudan, 
through its instruments, the Janjaweed militias.144  It is esti-
mated that 320,000 Sudanese will be killed in 2004.145  This is a 
situation crying out for humanitarian intervention.  Situations 
like it will no doubt continue to arise until humanitarian inter-
vention is transformed from an expedient accident to a categori-
cal imperative.  
 
  
 139. Bazyler, supra note 2, at 590; Andrew Field, The Legality of Humani-
tarian Intervention and the Use of Force in the Absence of United Nations Au-
thority, 26 MONASH U. L. REV. 339, 351 (2000).  
 140. Associated Press, Key Events Regarding Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge, 
CNN.com, at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9804/16/pol.pot.timeline/ 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2005).  See also Bazyler, supra note 2, at 550 (noting the 
killing of one to three million people in Cambodia).   
 141. Bazyler, supra note 2, at 611–18. 
 142. There were reports late in 2002 of at least eleven million Ethiopian 
people close to starvation and about thirty million people throughout Africa on 
the verge of starvation.  See Sudarsan Raghavan, Eleven Million Ethiopians 
May Face Starvation by March, KNIGHT RIDER WASH. BUREAU, Dec. 12, 2002. 
 143. August 2004. 
 144. Nicholas Kristof, This is Genocide and it is Happening NOW, THE AGE 
(Austl.), June 18, 2004, at 15. 
 145. This is considered a conservative estimate provided by the U.S. Agency 
for International Development.  Id.   
